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ABSTRACT: Thought experiments are frequently vague and obscure hypothetical sce-
narios that are difficult to assess. The paper proposes a simple model of thought exper-
iments. In the first part, I introduce two contemporary frameworks for thought experi-
ment analysis: an experimentalist approach that relies on similarities between real and 
thought experiment, and a reasonist approach focusing on the answers provided by 
thought experimenting. Further, I articulate a minimalist approach in which thought 
experiment is considered strictly as doxastic mechanism based on imagination. I intro-
duce the basic analytical tool that allows us to differentiate an experimental core from 
an attached argumentation. The last section is reserved for discussion. I address several 
possible questions concerning adequacy of minimalistic definition and analysis. 
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 Despite extensive discussions on the nature of thought experiments, there 
have been only a few attempts to explicitly grasp the way thought experiments 
are constructed. In the first part of my text, I present two of those attempts: 
Ray Sorensen’s structure of refuter and Nicholas Rescher’s quintet of complex 
hypothetical reasoning. While Sorensen emphasizes the similarities between 
real and thought experiments, Rescher underlines the relevant lesson we draw 
from a supposition. In the second part, I argue that both approaches rely on 
504  M A R E K  P I C H A  
dubious definitions of thought experiment. To avoid their unintuitive conse-
quences, I form a minimalist view where thought experiments are identified 
strictly with contemplation of a hypothetical scenario.  
 There are three questions I ask in each of the mentioned frameworks: 
 (i)  What is a thought experiment? 
 (ii)  What is the structure of a thought experiment? 
 (iii) Which discursive role does a thought experiment play?  
 The first question is conceptual and deals with a definition of thought ex-
periment. The second question is logical and concerns the relation of basic el-
ements within a thought experiment. The third question is dialectical and fo-
cuses on a connection of thought experiments and a standpoint in a critical 
dialogue.  
 The paper does not address epistemological issues of thought experimen-
tation, at least not directly. Both Sorensen and Rescher offer clues for thought 
experiments’ reconstruction, both elaborate their definitions into robust analyt-
ical frameworks—and there are no other major contributions to the explicit and 
universal structural analysis of though experiments. That is the sole reason 
why the paper focuses on their accounts; I will however discuss the relation 
between minimalism and other prominent approaches to thought experiments 
in the final section.  
1. Experimentalist approach  
 (i) Ray Sorensen defines thought experiment as “an experiment that pur-
ports to answer or raise question rationally without the benefit of execution” 
(Sorensen 1992, 205). In his view, there is a broad category of general experi-
ment. This category covers experiments that are performed by causal manipu-
lation in the environment, and also experiments that are just contemplated. 
What is a general experiment? Sorensen accepts the classical explication by 
which an experiment is a process of the variation of the independent variable 
and the measurement of the dependent variable. A thought experiment is the 
instance of a general experiment that is conducted by speculation, the change 
and measurement of variables is as–if executed. 
 (ii) Further, Sorensen explicitly mentions the logical structure of thought 
experiments (1992, 132). He puts forward two reasoning schemes, necessity 
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refuters and possibility refuters, which I present here in a simplified and unified 
version:1 
 1. source [S] 
 2. extraction [if S, then I] 
 3. content [C] 
 4. conditional [if I and C, then W] 
 5. dismissal [non-W] 
According to Sorensen, all thought experiments have a structure of paradox. 
One cannot hold as true all the propositions in the quintet, yet all of them seem 
plausible. From the argumentative point of view, they are instances of reduc-
tio: reasoning about an imaginary case C leads to an absurd result W that makes 
the provisional hypothesis S untenable. 
 Let me present the experimentalist analysis by using two examples. For the 
sake of clarity, the first one considers the trivial case of flying pigs, the second 
one is more subtle and deals with the famous Gettier example.  
 Case I: Flying Pigs 
 Suppose that pigs can fly. Wouldn’t we know that since we have radars? 
 1. source: Radars can register flying objects.  
 2. extraction: Radars would register flying objects of pig size.  
 3. content: Pigs can fly. 
 4. conditional: Radars would spot a flying pig. 
 5. dismissal: No radar has spotted a flying pig yet. 
The source statement about radars leads to a consequence that we would detect 
flying pigs. This consequence is dismissed as absurd—not in terms of logical 
or nomological impossibility, but in terms of sheer improbability. The follow-
ing analysis is a very slight modification of Sorensen’s own regimentation of 
Gettier’s thought experiment (1992, 137). 
                                                          
1  Sorensen proposes two variants of the same general scheme based on modalized 
modus tollens. They differ in few details which I find too minor to reproduce here. For 
the sake of simplicity I have thus omitted modal operators and distinction between 
“content possibility” and “content copossibility” in his reconstructions; for the whole 
picture see Sorensen (1992, 136 and 153). 
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 Case II: Gettier example 
Suppose that Mr. Smith has justified belief that is true by some unforeseen 
coincidence. Does Mr. Smith have knowledge? 
 1. source: The definition of knowledge is justified true belief. 
 2. extraction: If knowledge is justified true belief, then if any person has 
justified true belief that p, then the person knows that p. 
 3. content: It is possible for Smith to be justifiably right for the wrong 
reason. 
 4. conditional: If all justified true believers that p have knowledge that p 
and Smith is justifiably right but for the wrong reason, then Smith 
knows that p because of luck. 
 5. dismissal: It is impossible for anyone’s knowledge to be due to luck. 
 (iii) What is the dialectical role of thought experiments? Sorensen presents 
a thought experiment as a tool for attacking a standpoint. Imaginary cases are 
put forward as counterexamples, they focus on the refutation of a modal state-
ment held or implied by an opponent. In scientific discourse, a thought exper-
iment may serve as a test of hypothesis. The experimenter attempts to falsify 
the hypothesis by appeal to its counterintuitive consequences.  
 Karl Popper famously yet vaguely mentions three possible types of thought 
experiments: critical, heuristic and apologetic (cf. Popper 1992, 464). Thought 
experiments of the first type are meant to refute a theory, heuristic experiments 
illustrate and apologetic experiments support a theory. As we see, Sorensen’s 
approach does not count with an apologetic or heuristic use of a thought ex-
periment. In an experimentalist framework, all experiments are aimed at refut-
ing a source statement and therefore are straightforwardly critical. 
2. Reasonist approach 
 (i) According to Nicholas Rescher, thought experiments are complex 
courses of hypothetical reasoning. A thought experiment is a “lesson learned 
by deriving a conclusion from supposition and background knowledge” 
(Rescher 2005, 8). Rescher describes thought experimentation as a train of 
thought during which we imagine a scenario, consider the circumstances, infer 
provisional outcomes and pick the most plausible one. However, that is not 
enough; there has to be a serious question we are trying to answer. Rescher 
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explicitly mentions answering a larger question and drawing a larger lesson. 
Not every conclusion reaching process based on hypothetical reasoning is thus 
a thought experiment—only some of them qualify as such and the rest is a mere 
speculation (cf. Rescher 2005, 6). Rescher mentions the following question as 
an example of mere speculation: What if one could converse with flowers? 
Such a question is not able to constitute a thought experiment; there is no larger 
problem to solve. I will discuss the distinction in more detail later. 
 (ii) Thought experiment is a subtype of hypothetical reasoning. By 
Rescher’s definition, there must be five elements present in genuine thought 
experimentation: 
 1. supposition  
 2. context-specification 
 3. conclusion-deriving 
 4. lesson drawing 
 5. synoptic reasoning 
 The first three steps are quite straightforward: we introduce a supposition 
into a context to get a conclusion. According to Rescher, a supposition is a 
provisionary accepted proposition, i.e. the proposition we are in fact agnostic 
about or even the proposition we disbelieve in. Context-specification provides 
additional information about the scenario. Clues about who, what, where and 
when may be crucial for reaching the conclusions of the thought experiments. 
In the third step, we infer the conclusion from the given supposition and back-
ground beliefs fixed by context. However, Rescher points out that the result of 
a thought experiment is not the conclusion itself, but the lesson we learn from 
the conclusion. To illustrate his view about lesson drawing, he uses a slightly 
obscure example: 
 Case III: Yet Again Flying Pigs 
 Suppose that pigs can fly. Wouldn’t it be an interesting thought experiment? 
 1. supposition: Pigs can fly. 
 2. context: Animals exercise their abilities on suitable circumstances. 
 3. conclusion: Pigs will sometimes fly. 
 4. lesson: Not every thought experiment is all that interesting. 
 5. reasoning: Yet Again Flying Pigs is an example of uninteresting thought 
experiment.  
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 There is a strange self-reference in Rescher’s reasoning when the first three 
steps are mentioned in step four. Fortunately, Rescher later offers a more 
straightforward example when he considers the thought experiment about the 
relation between morality and our ability to predict (see Rescher 2005, 13). I 
propose the following regimentation: 
 Case IV: Unanticipated Results 
Suppose people have no capacity for foresight. Would they be responsible 
for their actions? 
 1. supposition: People have no capacity for foresight. 
 2. context: Capacity for foresight is necessary for predicting consequences 
of actions.  
 3. conclusion: People cannot predict consequences of their actions. 
 4. lesson: Predictive foresight is a crucial precondition of morality. 
 5. reasoning: Moral responsibility is crucially dependent upon foresight. 
I understand the quintet as a simple structure where a conclusion derived from 
a supposition and context serves as an input for reasoning leading to a lesson. 
A context and reasoning are warrants; they capture the way a supposition is 
connected to a conclusion, and a conclusion to a lesson, respectively.  
 (iii) Considering the relation of thought experiments to standpoints, 
Rescher’s approach is in accordance with Popper’s. Thought experiments can 
be used as a constructive support for a standpoint; they can be used destruc-
tively as well. However, Rescher and Popper differ in their evaluation of the 
constructive use. Popper is highly suspicious about apologetic/constructive 
thought experiments and does not admit them as a legitimate part of scientific 
method (see Pooper 1992, 466 and 473). On the other hand, Rescher is more 
benevolent towards thought experiments; both destructive and constructive 
ones are valuable tools of inquiry. Though, he points out that constructive 
thought experiment does not support a standpoint as a proof but only as a plau-
sible reasoning (see Rescher 2005, 34).2  
                                                          
2  Rescher also mentions the explanatory use of thought experiments, but unfortu-
nately not with much detail. As it seems, formulating an explanation of phenomenon B 
in the form ‘if A happens, then B happens’ is for Rescher a type of thought experimen-
tation. See Rescher (2005, 16 and 51).  
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3. Minimalist approach 
 Both Sorensen and Rescher consider thought experimentation as a process 
in which we yield a result from the initial supposition. For Sorensen, the result 
is the refutation of the source statement; for Rescher, the result of a thought 
experiment is the final lesson we draw. The minimalist position is different: 
both of the mentioned results do not belong to the thought experiment itself. 
The refutation of the source statement and the lesson learned is extra. 
 (i) Thought experimentation is a particular way we accept a belief. Mini-
malism sees thought experimentation as a doxastic mechanism built upon im-
agination. Thought experiment is thus defined as “a set of instructions which 
specify what to imagine provided a particular cognitive goal is pursued” (Picha 
2011b, 22).  
 There are two necessary conditions for a thought experiment. First, one is 
asked to imagine a situation, a scene, a state of a possible world. Thought ex-
perimentation is a method; it is a way of how to try solving a given task, and it 
requires a specific mental capacity. Let us call the person who brings up a 
thought experiment a promoter and the person who should execute the exper-
iment an experimenter. The promoter instructs the experimenter to find the 
answer by envisaging the scenario followed by the educated guess of the result. 
It would not be a thought experiment if one finds the answer either by calcu-
lating the result, by the real world execution or by a public survey.  
 Secondly, imagination is involved in order to find a solution to the given 
task. An experimenter is imagining the scenario to guess what would probably 
happen under the described circumstances. Imagination driven by other mo-
tives does not count as thought experimenting—for instance, when someone 
fantasies about resting in a silent comfortable place to calm down tense emo-
tions or when a child amuses herself by picturing the world where pigs can fly.  
 (ii) According to minimalism, thought experiments are neither paradoxes 
nor lessons; thought experiments are just segments of those structures. Thought 
experiments correspond solely to a content possibility in Sorensen’s structure 
or to the first three steps of Rescher’s structure where a supposition and a con-
text lead to a conclusion. A thought experiment is thus just the part of complex 
hypothetical reasoning where one contemplates an imaginary situation and re-
solves the related task. The minimalist structure of a thought experiment re-
sembles the structure of an experiment in general. There are two pairs of inter-
connected propositions: 
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 1. input i  
 2. output o 
 3. modification m 
 4. result r 
 The input is the starting point of thought experiment. A promoter suggests 
a proposition as an accepted one. The input is meant to be taken for granted 
and there should be no discussion involved. It usually describes a familiar sit-
uation or puts up an obvious point. As an example, here is the input of Flying 
Pigs: 
 1. input: Some fairly big animals can fly.  
 The output is a proposition stating what would happen under the circum-
stances given as the input. More precisely, an output specifies how input 
should be treated. Besides natural thought experiments concerning what would 
happen, there are also conceptual thought experiments where we are interested 
in what one would say. In other cases, we may be looking for answers to the 
behavioral question what one would do under specified circumstances, or what 
one morally or instrumentally should do, and so on. I reconstruct the output of 
Flying Pigs as follows: 
 2. output: Radars would detect these big flying animals. 
 Both the input and output instantiate a baseline which is normal, usual, ob-
vious, or at least a provisionally accepted description of a segment of our 
world. The baseline may express various features, causal relation between in-
put and output, traditional evaluation of situation captured by the input, ac-
cepted definition, common policy, working hypothesis and so on. It is impos-
sible to give an exhaustive overview of all possible relations between input and 
output. Generally speaking, there are two kinds of bridging principles forming 
two kinds of baselines: factive baseline grasping the way the world or its parts 
behave, and evaluative baseline describing our attitude to the facts.3 The base-
line of a thought experiment states what the experimenters should take for 
                                                          
3  Tamar Szabó Gendler proposes a third kind: the conceptual thought experiments. I 
treat conceptual thought experiments as instances of factual thought experiments. See 
Gendler (2000, 25) and Picha (2011b, 25). 
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granted and what they should focus on in forthcoming supposition. The base-
line is often implicit; therefore, its reconstructions may vary. However, the 
proper reconstruction is the one that grasps the bridging principle intended by 
the promoter of the experiment.  
 The modification of input is the only element that must be explicitly for-
mulated in every thought experiment. A modification is the iconic step in 
thought experimentation—the what-if moment, the supposition. The pro-
moter gives instructions what to imagine; the experimenter at least provi-
sionally accepts the prescribed proposition. The modification of Flying Pigs 
is obvious: 
 3. modification: Pigs can fly. 
 And finally, the experimenter forms a belief about what would happen in 
such a scenario. In other words, the result of a thought experiment is the prop-
osition the experimenter accepts upon consideration of the modification under 
the aspect fixed in the baseline.  
 4. result: Radars would detect flying pigs.  
 As we may see, the minimalist model of thought experimentation is really 
simple and, well, minimalistic. The baseline tells us what to focus on in the 
following scenario. The modification tells us what scene to imagine. The result 
is obtained by focusing on the imagined scene. To get a better picture of the 
minimalist reconstructions, I propose an analysis of the three thought experi-
ments mentioned above: 
 Case II: Gettier example 
 1. i: A person has justified true belief that p.  
 2. o: That person knows that p. 
 3. m: Smith has justified true belief that p. 
 4. r: Smith would not know that p. 
 Case III: Yet Again Flying Pigs  
 1. i: Some fairly big animals can fly. 
 2. o: Those fairly big animals would fly. 
 3. m: Pigs can fly. 
 4. r: Pigs would fly. 
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 Case IV: Unanticipated Results 
 1. i: People have capacity for foresight. 
 2. o: People are morally responsible. 
 3. m: People have no capacity for foresight. 
 4. r: People would not be morally responsible. 
Minimalism holds that thought experiments themselves bring us nothing more 
than these almost trivial beliefs. The real struggle begins when the experi-
mental results are implanted into arguments.4  
 (iii) Minimalism is a “narrow” conception: thought experiments are identi-
fied strictly with the process of estimating what would happen under the stip-
ulated circumstances. The superstructure built upon the belief accepted in this 
way is not part of the thought experiment—minimalism thus draws the line 
between thought experimentation and argumentation. The scenario induces a 
belief in the experimenter and the belief may then serve as an accepted premise 
in any type of argumentation.  
 Thought experiments are usually foundations for paradoxes, lessons and 
reductio, but are not identical with either of these. It means that thought exper-
iments are not constructive or destructive by their inner structure, i.e. baseline 
and modification, or by their results. Experimental results are simply used in 
arguments – and it depends on the relation of the argument to the standpoint 
whether the experimental result is deployed as a support or as a rebuttal.  
 Sometimes we are satisfied with the answer to the particular question and 
a thought experiment does not need to be a part of an argumentation. Nonethe-
less, more often a thought experiment is promoted as a (hypothetical) case 
study, i.e. the thought experiment plays a part in a persuasive dialogue in a 
form of an argument from thought experiment. The scheme of this argument is 
very simple—it is a variant of the basic argument from an example, the only 
special ingredient is the way the particular example is obtained:  
 1. The thought experiment induces belief that b.  
 2. b is an example of the principle P. 
 3. Therefore principle P is (sometimes/typically/mostly/always) true. 
                                                          
4  For more minimalistic analyses of famous philosophical thought experiments see 
Picha & Pichová (2013). 
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 While the first premise just sums up the result of a thought experiment and 
the second premise presents the result as an exemplary case, the conclusion 
deserves a little more attention. The principle P in the conclusion can have one 
of the four following qualifications: some x is y (exemplification); x are typi-
cally y (plausible generalization); most x are y (probabilistic generalization); 
all x are y (universal generalization). The qualification of the principle P is an 
important factor when evaluating the argument: since all three mentioned types 
of generalization can be subjected to the critique of hasty generalization, the 
argument from thought experiment based on exemplification is significantly 
less fragile. The following reconstruction captures the deployment of the Get-
tier example: 
 1. Smith would not know that p.  
 2. Smith’s belief is the example of justified true belief that is not 
knowledge. 
 3. Therefore some justified true beliefs are not knowledge. 
The argumentation scheme enables the thought experiment to play the role of 
counterexample. In this way, the argumentation scheme based on exemplifica-
tion probably captures Popper’s idea of the critical use of thought experiment.  
 To sum up, a thought experiment plays exactly the same discursive role as 
an observation or a real experiment. They all elicit a belief that may further 
serve as a basis for refuting or supporting a standpoint. 
4. Discussion 
 I would like to face some possible questions about the mentioned analytical 
frameworks, especially minimalism. I will point out some important differ-
ences in the frameworks and show their not so intuitive consequences.  
4.1. Is not the minimalist definition of thought experiment  
too broad?  
 According to minimalism, whenever we solve a given task by imagining 
the described scenario and estimating the outcome, we are conducting a 
thought experiment. A minimalist is thus forced to categorize even the most 
common imagination-based problem solving as a thought experiment. Let me 
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give an example: You are facing the question whether your luggage will fit 
into the trunk of a car. You can find the answer by measuring and comparing 
the volume of your luggage and the trunk; you can solve the task by real ex-
perimentation and physically manipulate the luggage inside the car trunk; or 
you can rotate a mental representation of the luggage to fit into the mental 
representation of the car trunk. Minimalism holds that the last procedure counts 
as a thought experimentation. Minimalist definition with its emphasis on im-
agination is by no means novel. Similar approach was held by Ernst Mach who 
supposedly defined thought experiments “as the capacity to ‘imagine mentally 
the variation of facts’” (Engel 2011, 146); and Tamar Szabó Gendler who treats 
thought experiments as “reasoning about an imaginary scenario with the aim 
of confirming or disconfirming some hypothesis or theory” (Gendler 1998, 
398). What is new, however, is the fact that minimalism takes this definition 
strategy seriously and makes a clear cut between thought experiments and su-
perimposed arguments. 
 Of course, the minimalist definition is liberal. However, I will argue that 
the mentioned alternatives are either too restrictive, or they are liberal to the 
same extent. The experimentalist approach seems promising at first, but turns 
out to be very limiting when it comes to the structure and the usage of such 
“successful unexecuted experiments”. Experimentalism treats every thought 
experiment as a disguised paradox with a hypothetical premise. Surely, every 
thought experiment can be with some extra work built into a reductio. How-
ever, the goal of many hypothetical examples is just to support a proximate 
claim, not to refute a distant source statement. For instance, Yet Again Flying 
Pigs are very unambitious in this way.  
 The reasonist approach is restrictive by choice. Rescher is explicit about 
the distinction between thought experiments and mere speculations—a specu-
lation must be a part of some larger problem to be a thought experiment. Alas, 
Rescher is not clear about the “larger problem” and I see at least three possible 
interpretations. First, a problem is larger when it relates to something worthy 
and sublime. Thought experiments would be therefore thematically restricted. 
For example, speculations about conversation with flowers are not thought ex-
periments, but speculations about conversation with newborns might be. Since 
there are many prototypical instances of thought experiments about unassum-
ing problems, this interpretation seems obviously wrong.  
 According to the second interpretation, a problem is larger when it relates 
to something general. A speculation becomes a thought experiment when it 
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supports or disproves a general claim. I find this interpretation of the “larger 
problem” too restrictive, because the experimenter might be sometimes inter-
ested solely in a particular outcome of a hypothetical scenario; for instance, 
when asked how many road turns would it take to get to the nearest hospital.  
 The third interpretation holds that a problem is larger when there is a ques-
tion involved in the speculation. The thought experiment would be a hypothet-
ical scenario accompanied by a relevant question. For instance, “What if one 
could converse with flowers?” is not a thought experiment (cf. Rescher 2005, 
6), but “What if one could converse with flowers? Would flowers have some 
concepts totally incomprehensible for humans?” is a thought experiment. This 
third interpretation of the “larger problem” is very liberal and in fact perfectly 
matches a minimalist approach: modification (“mere speculation” in Rescher’s 
terms) is accompanied by a baseline which determines what in modification 
should be of the experimenter’s interest (the “larger problematic issue”). 
Therefore, if the “lesson learned” in a reasonist definition truly means the 
“question answered”, then the reasonist and the minimalist definitions are 
equally liberal.5  
 Finally, let me point out the most important distinction between minimalist 
and reasonist definitions. As was mentioned before, the reasonist considers 
thought experiments as lessons learned by the combination of supposition and 
contextual information. Rescher holds that at least some mathematical prob-
lems are thought experiments. He gives two numerical examples: the first one 
is “If 4 were a prime, there could be five prime numbers between 2 and 12”, 
the second one is a set of three equations with two unknown variables (see 
Rescher 2005, 4-5). The reasonist definition forces such categorization because 
the mathematical examples are lessons learned by supposing a numerical value 
in the context of a set or an equation. On the other hand, the minimalist defini-
tion draws a strict line between thought experiments and mathematical exam-
ples. There is a difference when one is asked to imagine a situation and when 
one is instructed to do the math. The methodological instructions may be im-
plicit and contextual, but it would definitely be a misunderstanding when one 
                                                          
5  I am not convinced though that Rescher is liberal to that extent. The following 
passage suggests that a lesson is more than just a basic answer: “The larger lesson in-
volved in a thought experiment does not lie in the substances of the consequences that 
follow from its launching suppositions, but rather in the wider ramifications of the hig-
her–level circumstances that, given the wider cognitive context at issue, those consequ-
ences ensue from the supposition” (Rescher 2005, 13). 
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solves the Flying Pigs in a philosophy class by calculating the surface and the 
reflective properties of the average pig.  
 Is the minimalist definition too broad? I hope not. The minimalist definition 
is not arbitrarily restrictive as with the experimentalist one. However, it allows 
us to distinguish a thought experimentation from other types of problem solv-
ing, namely from a calculation. 
4.2. What are the identity conditions for thought experiments? 
 Experimentalism and reasonism are “wide” approaches to thought experi-
ments. They identify a thought experiment not only with a speculation, but also 
with the way the speculation is further used. For Sorensen, the identity condi-
tions of a general experiment include the experimenter’s intention (cf. 
Sorensen 1992, 133). Two identical experimental setups may constitute two 
different experiments depending on the hypothesis they are supposed to prove 
or disprove. To give Sorensen’s own example, ringing a bell before feeding the 
animals and observing their behavior may constitute at least two different ex-
periments—one testing the hypothesis that animals can hear and the other test-
ing the hypothesis that animals can be conditioned. Since thought experiments 
belong to a class of experiments, the same identity condition applies: the setup 
(i.e. the absurd result W obtained from combination of content C and extraction 
I) can constitute multiple thought experiments. For instance, in Sorensen’s re-
constructions of the Gettier example the result that Smith knows that p because 
of luck rebuts the classic analysis of knowledge. However, it would be a dif-
ferent experiment, if the intention of the experimenter was, for instance, to 
support a claim about compatibility of knowledge and epistemic luck.  
 The reasonist approach leads to the same consequences as experimental-
ism. Rescher claims that a thought experiment is constituted not only by a sup-
position, a contextual background and a derived conclusion, but by a lesson as 
well. Therefore, a change of a lesson means a change of the identity of a 
thought experiment. Let us stay with the Gettier example: the conclusion that 
Smith does not know p may yield a lesson that the classic analysis of knowledge 
is wrong or a lesson that we should be cautious about testimonial justification. 
The two different lessons mean two different thought experiments.  
 Wide approaches have troubles with open-ended thought experiments, i.e. 
scenarios without explicit or implicit result. A prominent example is Lucretius’ 
spear where one is asked what would happen to a spear thrown out at the edge 
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of the universe. Different answers mean different conclusions, different con-
clusions mean different lessons, and different lessons mean different thought 
experiments.  
 Minimalism holds that the identity conditions of a thought experiment are 
fully captured by the modification and the baseline. The result of the same 
thought experiment may be used in different arguments, it may change in time 
and it may be relative to a belief system, but none of that has any influence on 
the identity of the thought experiment itself. Therefore, the Gettier example 
may be included in many different arguments about the definition of 
knowledge or the justification condition or the role of certainty. Lucretius’ 
spear is still the same experiment whether we guess that the spear would hit 
something or whether we guess that the spear would continue its movement.  
4.3. Which level of analysis is appropriate?  
 Every thought experiment can be reconstructed in several ways. The recon-
structions usually differ with respect to the superficial details of the scenario 
(e.g. “Smith believes that Jones will get the job” vs. “Smith believes that p”), 
but there could be more profound difference as well. Let me illustrate the point 
by two possible minimalist reconstructions of Unanticipated Results. The first 
reconstruction is simple and was already presented above: 
 i: People have capacity for foresight. 
 o: People are morally responsible. 
 m: People have no capacity for foresight. 
 r: People would not be morally responsible. 
That is all. The question about moral responsibility is reconstructed as an in-
ternal part of the thought experiment. The second minimalist reconstruction of 
Unanticipated Results is more elaborate and much closer to Rescher’s own 
analysis: 
 i: People have capacity for foresight. 
 o: People are able to predict the consequences of their actions. 
 m: People have no capacity for foresight. 
 r: People would not be able to predict the consequences of their actions. 
The result is then qualified through argument from thought experiment to the 
principle constituting the following argumentation: 
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 1. Principle: Foresight is a necessary condition for the ability to predict 
consequences of action. 
 2. Ability to predict consequences of action is a necessary condition for 
moral responsibility. 
 3. Therefore, people would not be morally responsible. 
Which of the analyses is the proper one? The first one where a thought exper-
iment leads us to a moral claim, or the second one where the experimental 
result is a psychological assessment?  
 Minimalism holds that there is one major rule of interpretation: the ade-
quate reconstruction of a thought experiment reflects the intention of the pro-
moter. Sometimes, the description of a thought experiment is complete or we 
can even inquire the honest promoter himself, thus we have an excellent source 
of information about the promoter’s intentions. Other times, we have to cope 
with the limited contextual clues about the intended purpose of the thought 
experiment.  
 Let us say that in the case of Unanticipated Results we have nothing more 
to work with than the explicit instructions: Suppose people have no capacity 
for foresight. Would they be responsible for their actions? There is no mention 
about the ability to predict the consequences of actions. I would therefore sug-
gest the first minimal reconstruction with a moral assessment. However, if the 
instructions were as follows: Suppose people have no capacity for foresight. 
Would they be responsible for their actions, since they would not be able to 
predict the consequences of their actions? I would prefer the second recon-
struction with the argumentative extension. 
4.4. What about other approaches to thought  
experimentation?  
 Minimalism is not a theory of epistemic value of thought experiment. Its 
purpose is to offer a framework for concise structural analyses based on 
widely accepted assumption that thought experimentation is a kind of imag-
inative reasoning. The key element is the careful distinction between doxas-
tic process of belief elicitation through imagination, and argumentation 
based upon this belief. According to minimalism, thought experiments 
should be identified with the doxastic process regardless the superimposed 
argumentation. I will point out relations between minimalism and some dis-
tinct contributions to the debate about nature of thought experiments, namely 
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Norton’s eliminativism and Gendler’s constructivism. Let me demonstrate 
their approaches by the famous debate on Galileo’s example with falling bod-
ies.  
 Case V: Pisa Experiment 
Then if we had two moveables whose natural speeds were unequal, it is 
evident that were we to connect the slower to the faster, the latter would be 
partly retarded by the slower, and this would be partly speeded up by the 
faster. … But if this is so, and if it is also true that a large stone is moved 
with eight degrees of speed, for example, and a smaller one with four [de-
grees], than joining both together, their composite will be moved with a 
speed less than eight degrees. But the two stones joined together make a 
larger stone than the first one which was moved with eight degrees of speed; 
therefore this greater stone is moved less swiftly than the lesser one. But 
this is contrary to your assumption. So you see how, from the supposition 
that the heavier body is moved more swiftly than the less heavy, I conclude 
that the heavier move less swiftly. (Galileo 1974, 65) 
 John D. Norton advocates the radical view that all thought experiments are 
only “disguised arguments”, i.e. arguments with premises about hypothetical 
states of affairs of particulars (Norton 1996, 336). His reconstruction of Pisa 
Experiments therefore emphasizes the elements of Galileo’s general argumen-
tation (Norton 1996, 341-342): 
 Norton’s reconstruction of Pisa Experiment 
 1. The speed of fall of bodies in a given medium is proportionate to their 
weights. 
 2. If a large stone fall with 8 degrees of speed, a smaller stone half its 
weight will fall with 4 degrees of speed. 
 3. If a slower falling stone is connected to a faster falling stone, the slower 
will retard the faster and the faster speed the slower. 
 4. If the two stones of 2 are connected, their composite will fall slower 
than 8 degrees of speed. 
 5. The composite of the two weights has greater weight than the larger. 
 6. The composite will fall faster than 8 degrees. 
 7. Conclusion 4 and 6 contradict. 
 8. Therefore, we must reject Assumption 1. 
 9. Therefore, all stones fall alike. 
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The reconstruction is motivated by Norton’s view on epistemology of 
thought experiments. Premises about particulars (i.e. premises 2, 4 and 6) are 
irrelevant to the conclusion in the sense that they can be replaced by non-
particular premises without a loss of demonstrative power. Epistemic value 
of thought experiments is thus equal to the general arguments behind the 
particular cases. 
 Tamar Szabó Gendler refuses Norton’s claims about epistemic irrelevance 
of particular details in two steps. At first, she offers her own stark 
argumentative reconstruction of the experiment (Gendler 1998, 404): 
 Gendler’s reconstruction of Pisa Experiment 
 1. Natural speed is mediative. 
 2. Weight is additive. 
 3.  Therefore, natural speed is not directly proportional to weight. 
At second, she claims that the reconstruction does not grasp everything we 
learn from the experiment. By contemplating the scenario we get to see the 
proper „way out“—the adjustment of stipulated theory needed to resolve the 
paradox. The stark argumentative reconstruction leaves many ways out open, 
whereas the thought experiment specifies which claim needs to be 
abandoned.  
 What can minimalism add to this debate concerning epistemology of 
thought experiments? I will reconstruct Pisa experiment and show that both 
Norton and Gendler might be right. In fact, I will present three possible 
minimalistic reconstructions; let me start with the most opulent one: 
 Minimalistic reconstruction of Pisa Experiment I 
 (The first thought experiment)  
 i1:  The faster stone is connected to the slower stone. 
 o1:  The slower stone will slow down the faster stone. 
 m1: The faster falling stone is connected to the slower falling stone. 
 r1:  The slower falling stone would slow down the faster falling stone.  
 (The second thought experiment)  
 i2:  Two objects are connected. 
 o2:  Their composite is heavier then its part. 
 m2: The falling stone is connected to the other falling stone. 
 r2:  The composite of two falling stones is heavier than its part.  
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 (Argument) 
 1.  A composite is heavier than its part. [from r2] 
 2.   Speed of fall is proportional to weight. [assumption] 
 3.   The speed of falling composite would be higher than the speed of its 
falling part. [from r2 and 2] 
 4.   The speed of falling composite would be lower than the speed of its 
falling part. [from r1] 
 5.   Therefore speed of fall is not proportional to weight. 
As said before, minimalism draws a strict line between imagination-based 
belief acquisition and argumentation. The reconstruction above stresses the 
role of imagination in Galileo’s case. There are two thought experiments which 
serve as a basis for reductio. The reconstruction supports Gendler’s critique of 
eliminativism: these experiments are crucial for backing up premises 1 and 4 
in the argument, thus leaving only the premise 2 open for rebuttal. 
 Another possible reconstruction simply omits the second thought 
experiment. Let me therefore just repeat the first thought experiment and show 
the slight change in the argument:  
 Minimalistic reconstruction of Pisa Experiment II 
 (Thought experiment)  
 i1:   The faster stone is connected to the slower stone. 
 o1:  The slower stone will slow down the faster stone. 
 m1:  The faster falling stone is connected to the slower falling stone. 
 r1:  The slower falling stone would slow down the faster falling stone. 
 (Argument’) 
 1.   A composite is heavier than its part. [assumption] 
 2.   Speed of fall is proportional to weight. [assumption] 
 3.   The speed of falling composite would be higher than the speed of its 
falling part. [from 1 and 2] 
 4.   The speed of falling composite would be lower than the speed of its 
falling part. [from r1] 
 5.   Therefore speed of fall is not proportional to weight. 
 This second reconstruction is probably the most mundane one. There is 
only one thought experiment involved, the reductio is established partly upon 
experimental result, partly upon assumption about additive nature of weight.  
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 The third possible reconstruction is radical: 
 Minimalistic reconstruction of Pisa Experiment III 
 (Argument’’) 
 1.   A composite is heavier than its part. [assumption] 
 2.   Speed of fall is proportional to weight. [assumption] 
 3.   The speed of falling composite would be higher than the speed of its 
falling part. [from 1 and 2] 
 4.   The slower falling object would slow down the connected faster 
falling object. [assumption] 
 5.   Therefore speed of fall is not proportional to weight. 
 According to this view, there is no imagination involved in Pisa 
Experiment. We are dealing with general argument based upon two 
assumptions presented as obvious (premises 1 and 4) and one theoretical 
postulate (premise 2). There would be no thought experimentation in Galileo’s 
example under this reconstruction. This perspective supports Norton’s 
approach: details about falling objects (i.e. their weight and the fact that they 
are stones) are irrelevant to the conclusion. Particulars play no epistemically 
relevant part in Pisa Experiment.6 
 Minimalist reconstructions of Pisa Experiment show us how the debate 
betwen Norton and Gendler boils down to the interpretation of two sentences:  
Then if we had two moveables whose natural speeds were unequal, it is 
evident that were we to connect the slower to the faster, the latter would be 
partly retarded by the slower, and this would be partly speeded up by the 
faster. 
But the two stones joined together make a larger stone than the first one 
which was moved with eight degrees of speed. 
 Does the protagonist instruct us to imagine something or is he just explicitly 
pointing out shared background knowledge? Minimalist framework itself does 
not tell us which interpretation is appropriate; it does, however, show how 
                                                          
6  Gendler (1998, 408) claims that „no austere argumentative reconstruction will be 
able to do this, because part of the thought experiment’s function is to bring the Aristo-
telian to accept certain premises“. I have shown that such reconstruction is in fact pos-
sible. For more discussion see Norton (2004) or Picha (2011a). 
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interpretation of the two sentences translates into Norton’s view and Gendler’s 
critique. Personally, I am inclined to interpret these two sentences as 
postulates. They are evident and so simple that further appeal to imagination 
would be redundant. I favor the third reconstruction of Pisa Experiment; there 
is no thought experiment involved, Galileo presents a general argument with 
minor illustrations and Norton’s eliminativist approach to Pisa Experiment is 
sound. However, I strongly disagree with Norton’s transfer of the succesful 
elimination of Pisa Experiment to other thought experiments. In many cases 
we are explicitly instructed to imagine a scenario and then transform the result 
into a premise. Thoughts experiments frequently provide support for less 
obvious premises and arguments would be significantly weaker without them. 
On a larger scale, I therefore adopt Gendler’s claim on the indispensability of 
thought experiments.  
 Let me again point out the fact that minimalism provides an analytical 
framework and as such is neutral to the debate about justificatory power of 
thought experimentation. Minimalism has therefore no necessary connections 
to Mach’s conception of instinctive knowledge, Kuhn’s conceptualism, 
Brown’s platonism, Williamson’s deflationary account and so on.  
5. Summary 
 Thought experiments are hard to deal with. They involve bold suppositions 
formulated in vague language with distracting details and implicit elements 
prone to misinterpretation. I have presented three attempts to overcome such 
difficulties by informal reconstruction of a thought experiment. Sorensen’s ex-
perimentalism emphasizes the compliance between real and thought experi-
ments. Hypothetical scenarios are means of refutation with the structure of par-
adox. Rescher’s reasonism focuses on inferring a broad conclusion from a sup-
position. I argue that both attempts are based on a wide analysis of the notion 
of thought experiment. Both experimentalism and reasonism therefore moti-
vate reconstructions that include not only the thought experimental core, but 
the argumentative superstructure as well.  
 I propose a minimal model for reconstruction, which draws a strict line 
between the thought experiment itself and the way the experimental result is 
used. There are two key components: modification and baseline. A modifica-
tion instructs an experimenter what to imagine; a baseline tells him what to do 
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and what to pay attention to. According to minimalism, the modification and 
the baseline fully capture all the dialectically relevant features of a thought 
experiment. I further argue that a dismissal of thought experiments is more 
likely a disagreement with the argument built upon a trivial experimental re-
sult. Thought experimentation is more frequent and less suspicious than ex-
pected. 
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